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ARTICLE
ALL HANDS ON DECK: COLLABORATIVE
GLOBAL STRATEGIES IN THE BATTLE
AGAINST CORRUPTION AND HUMAN
TRAFFICKING IN AFRICA
REAGAN R. DEMAS
Bribery is the enemy of justice.
—East African proverb
INTRODUCTION
An officer solicits a tourist for a bribe.  A multinational corporation
pays thousands of dollars to government officials to avoid onerous and un-
certain legal and regulatory requirements. A human trafficker pays the po-
lice to provide protection to his illegal operation of rape for profit.
This is corruption, and the costs of corruption are felt everywhere in
Africa.  Millions of dollars are spent in global government funds to conduct
investigations and prosecute cases of corruption.  Millions more are spent
by private companies on internal investigations, training, and compliance.
All the while, millions of human beings are forced to labor on the African
continent against their will, often without resort to law enforcement, which
has been compromised by their abusers and traffickers.
The author of this paper has personally witnessed each of these frustra-
tions of purpose.  I have looked into the eyes of the trafficking victim, and
of the trafficking survivor.  I have stood face to face with the southern Afri-
can police officer who made his living protecting exploiters instead of the
exploited, and with the East African police commissioner who made the
bold decision to say “no more” by firing officers who refused to enforce the
law in exchange for personal pecuniary gain.
There is little disagreement today that official corruption in Africa and
other developing jurisdictions is detrimental.  But what specific impact does
corruption have on human rights in jurisdictions where it flourishes, and
what can and should be done to curtail it?
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This article analyzes the effects that corruption and the lack of a rule of
law have on the issue of human trafficking.  It first considers the effects that
corruption has on development in Africa, noting that the rule of law is not
simply a Western concept and arguing that corruption is not an acceptable
part of any culture.  It then analyzes the impacts of corruption on human
trafficking.  Finally, the article addresses the broad-based initiatives neces-
sary to curb corruption in Africa and beyond, and the benefits in the war
against human trafficking that would ensue.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW
The Effects of Corruption in Africa
A “rule of law” is generally defined as a system of justice where the
law is general, clear, practicable, and consistently enforced.1  In effect, a
society with a rule of law is one where both the written law and the applica-
tion of the written law is known by both those who will be held accountable
to the law and those who will be enforcing the law.  Corruption, on the
other hand, is the arbitrary use of public powers for personal benefit.2  It
usually involves “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a pub-
lic role because of private . . . pecuniary or status gain.”3 Corruption breaks
down the rule of law by eroding its clarity and consistency.  A broken rule
of law, in turn, stymies development in a society and impoverishes the
populace.4
The effects of corruption are numerous.  The absence of a rule of law
as a result of corruption leads primarily to the insecurity of people, prop-
erty5 and rights, unabated crime, instability, and even war.6  It also de-
1. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–41 (rev. ed. 1969).
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 371 (8th ed. 2004).
3. J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967).
4. See O. Lee Reed, Law, The Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private
Market and Business Study, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 441, 446 (2001) (“Perhaps the single most important
step that countries can take to maximize growth and make themselves attractive to global business
interests is to institute the rule of law.”). See also Policy Statement, Global Coalition for Africa –
Corruption and Development in Africa, GCA/PF/N.2/11/1997 (“Corruption in Africa is a develop-
ment issue. . . . [E]ffectively addressing corruption in African countries has become a develop-
ment imperative.”).
5. See Reed, supra note 4, at 459 (“Studies reveal that the economies of countries that enjoy
secure property under a rule of law, which is the condition often termed “economic freedom,”
regularly outperform the economies where property is insecure or non-existent.”).
6. See U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFRICA, AFRICAN GOVERNANCE REPORT 2005, at 172 U.N.
Sales No. E.05.IIK.7 (2005), available at http://www.uneca.org/agr2005/chap6.pdf (“While Afri-
can countries have overwhelmingly subscribed to most international and regional human rights
norms and standards, ratified numerous major human rights treaties and enshrined these norms
and standards in their constitutions and national legislations, a significant gap remains in their
realization. Some progress has been made on human rights, but the application of human rights
standards lags behind the substantial efforts made in ratifying human rights treaties and conven-
tions and the public statements and rhetoric of African leaders on human rights.”).
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creases investment,7 both foreign and domestic.8 These conditions in turn
lead to increased poverty,9 lower quality of health and education,10 and
lower quality infrastructure.11  Increased poverty, crime, and instability en-
hance the likelihood of unaccountable dictators or juntas using armed forces
to take control of a country and pursuing policies that might further impov-
erish the citizenry, destabilize political and economic circumstances, and
repel foreign and domestic investment.  The insecure environments of Dar-
fur today and Rwanda in 1994 are extreme—but all-too-real—examples of
what can happen when the rule of law breaks down.  The connection be-
tween corruption, lack of rule of law, and poverty is recognized in literature
and, even more convincingly, in the suffering of millions living under cor-
rupt regimes in the real world.12  Corruption and the lack of a rule of law
disproportionately harm the poor and vulnerable, particularly women and
children, because they depend on the protections of the law against power-
ful forces and possess few resources to compete where protection is auc-
tioned to the highest bidder.13
7. The importance of foreign direct investment in developing countries has been well docu-
mented. As one publication noted, “[T]he benefits of foreign direct investment to host countries
include not only jobs, tax revenues and economic growth, but also ‘spillover benefits’ such as
improvement of the quality of the local labor force and management skills, as well as the introduc-
tion of new technology and the transfer of technical know-how.” Delissa A. Ridgway & Mariya
A. Talib, Globalization and Development – Free Trade, Foreign Aid, Investment and the Rule of
Law, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 325, 334 n.59 (citing ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS,
MINIMIZING COSTS (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/51/1959815.pdf.
8. See, e.g., U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFRICA, STRIVING FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AF-
RICA: SYNOPSIS OF THE 2005 AFRICAN GOVERNANCE REPORT PREPARED FOR THE AFRICAN DEVEL-
OPMENT FORUM IV, at 21, available at http://www.uneca.org/agr/ (noting that investment in Africa
is limited by uncertain contract and property law); see also Philip M. Nichols, Corruption as an
Assurance Problem, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1307, 1316–17 (2004) (noting that corruption de-
creases foreign investment).
9. See Alhaji B. M. Marong, Toward a Normative Consensus Against Corruption, 30 DENV.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 99, 107–09 (2002); Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Consequences and Causes of
Corruption – What do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?, Working Paper No. V-34-
05, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe ISSN 1435-3520, 7–8, available at http://www.wiwi.uni-passau.
de/fileadmin/dokumente/lehrstuehle/lambsdorff/downloads/Corr_Review.pdf (providing evidence
and citations to numerous reports showing that corruption lowers growth).
10. See Marong, supra note 9, at 109 (noting that Africa “[lags] behind most regions of the
world in terms of flows of FDI and the rate of economic growth, and lead[s] the world in rates of
poverty, disease, unemployment, and general lack of development”). See also Lambsdorff, supra
note 9, at 9–10 (providing evidence and citations to reports showing that high levels of corruption
are associated with low quality of public health care provision).
11. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, The Economic Costs of Corruption in Infrastructure,
in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 12 (2005).
12. A rule of law is important to a fair and just society but not itself sufficient to create or
maintain one.  The law and the rule being consistently applied must itself be fair and just.
13. See generally Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi & Rosa Alonso-Terme, Does Corruption
Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?, 3 ECON. OF GOVERNANCE 23, 23–45 (2002).
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After years of corruption, stories of what could have been continue to
afflict Africa.14  Despite holding some of the world’s richest deposits of
minerals and oil, the median African country has a gross domestic product
(GDP) of only $2 billion, roughly equivalent to a small European town.15
Oil-rich Nigeria has earned over $350 billion from oil over the past forty
years, but most of it has been siphoned away by corrupt leaders, and today
the country’s population is one of the poorest on earth.16  In the West Afri-
can nation of Guinea, 80 percent of the country’s foreign reserves and the
vast percentage of its GDP derive from extremely valuable mineral mines,
but little of this wealth reaches citizens of Guinea.17  It ranks as the seventh
most corrupt state in the world by Transparency International and in the top
twenty least-developed countries by the United Nations.18  In 2008, police
in Guinea went on strike and took hostages because they had not been paid
their $11 monthly salaries for months due to empty government coffers.19
Equatorial Guinea pumps a barrel of oil per citizen daily, more per capita
than Saudi Arabia, and the vast majority of GDP is derived from the oil and
gas industry.20  Despite this source of wealth, the country is under the con-
trol of a corrupt dictatorship, and its people are desperately poor.21  In this
environment, even Africans do not invest in Africa.  Forty percent of Af-
rica’s private wealth is held offshore.22
Is Corruption Culturally Acceptable?
Despite the statistics illustrating the connection between corruption
and development,23 there are those who say it is inappropriate to impose
anti-corruption views on other countries. They call these views western
constructs, based upon western values, that are invasive and ignore African
cultural traditions.24 This relativist view25 of corruption undermines efforts
14. For a detailed examination of the costs of corruption, see Jonathan P. Doh, Peter Rodri-
guez, Klaus Uhlenbruck, Jamie Collins & Lorraine Eden, Coping with Corruption in Foreign
Markets, 17 ACAD. OF MGMT. EXEC. 114, 114–27 (2003).
15. ROBERT GUEST, THE SHACKLED CONTINENT 6 (2004).
16. ADAM ROBERTS, THE WONGA COUP 50–51 (2006).
17. See IRIN News Service, Guinea: State of Suspended Development After 50 Years of
Independence, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=80717.
18. Id.
19. See Saliou Samb, Guinea Police Take Commander Hostage in Pay Protest, REUTERS,
June 16, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL16393846.
20. See ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 50–52.
21. See id.
22. WORLD BANK, CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY? 6–17 (2000).
23. See supra notes 5–22.
24. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and
Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century?,
24 YALE J. INT’L L. 223, 232–39, 243–46 (1999).
25. This view implies that to call something “corrupt” is to attach an inappropriate normative
label to a practice from one cultural standpoint. However, a practice considered corrupt in one
culture because it demonstrably stymies development, emboldens criminal enterprises, and fetters
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to build a stable rule of law in Africa.  It also insults Africans who want and
deserve good governance, accountable leaders, and a life lived under an
enforced rule of law that encompasses and protects their cultural values.26
By definition, “corruption” is never culturally acceptable.27  Corrup-
tion implies that a system is violated or rules are ignored, thus impairing the
otherwise suitable system.28  No nation is eager to admit corruption when it
ranks in the top ten on Transparency International’s list of most corrupt
countries on earth.  While many of the most corrupt countries in the world
have prominent signs on display at their airports proclaiming a commitment
to end corruption, this author has yet to see a sign stating that any country is
proud to have a government bureaucracy that extracts unofficial payments
at every possible opportunity.  Abuses that are obviously wrong cannot be
practiced wantonly by societies that do not wish to be branded as global
pariahs.  Extortion is not an acceptable form of human interaction.  The
threat of bogus legal action or criminal sanction in the absence of the pay-
ment of a large bribe is not compatible with a civil society that respects
human rights.  The very fact that many of these practices can occur only
under cover of darkness—behind denials, closed doors, obfuscation, and
official cover-up—is compelling evidence that the practices are indeed un-
acceptable.  A young child who knocks over the cookie jar while sneaking a
sweet before dinner must quickly hide the broken pieces of the jar because
he knows he has done something wrong.  And when his parents ask how the
cookie jar was broken, the family cat will likely be blamed for the incident.
In the same way, few leaders are eager or even willing to admit that they are
“corrupt” because it is difficult to make a non-frivolous argument for the
morality of the practice.
Nigeria presents a prominent example of a country reputed to possess a
“culture of corruption.”29  Many who work or live in Nigeria say it is im-
possible to do so without paying bribes.  One company described how one
free markets should be considered inappropriate in any other jurisdiction suffering the same dev-
astating consequences.
26. When businesses or individuals with money come into poor developing countries and
find it difficult to get tasks done, there is a tendency to see the payment of unofficial payments as
“facilitating” needs and speeding up regular processes. Businesses, even individuals, with money
can actually propagate corruption in the belief that “there is no other way to get things done.” In
the end, these payments from individuals and entities play a substantial role in maintaining corrup-
tion and can, in fact, make it quite difficult to get things done without paying unofficial payments.
27. See DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ), CORRUPTION
AND GENDER: APPROACHES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TA (2004) (commissioned by Germany
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development).
28. While some developing countries lack the capacity to consistently enforce the rule of
law, it does not follow that it is part of the culture to allow those with greater power or money to
rule with impunity. See Natalie Bridgeman & David Hunter, Narrowing the Accountability Gap:
Toward a New Foreign Investor Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 187
(2008).
29. Six years ago, Nigeria was ranked the most corrupt country on earth by Transparency
International.  In 2008 it improved to 121st on that list. See Corruption: Nigeria’s Rating Im-
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Nigerian government official attempted to cloak bribes in the garb of legiti-
macy by printing a schedule of the unofficial payment amounts on govern-
ment letterhead and boldly posting them on the wall of his office.30  Other
Nigerian officials have created elaborately fake (but quite official-looking)
“receipts” to distribute to bribe-payers to document and “normalize” the
illegal payments.31  Some businesses have reported being required to pay
monthly payments—salaried bribes—to certain officials that dwarf the offi-
cials’ regular government pay.32  It is not difficult to see how one could
make the argument that corruption is an inherent part of Nigerian culture.
The truth, however, is that Nigerian culture has never embraced brib-
ery.  In traditional Nigerian culture, local leaders or Chiefs exercised great
authority.  These individuals were consulted by citizens who sought solu-
tions to problems, difficult situations, or relational quagmires.  To seek a
favor or advice from a traditional leader, one might bring a gift.33  But this
gift was a sign of respect, not a quid pro quo.34  Charlatans and get-rich-
quick entrepreneurs (both foreign and domestic) have exploited Nigeria’s
tradition of gift-giving to fuel today’s explosion of bribery and corruption.
As the former President of Nigeria has said:
In the African concept of appreciation and hospitality, a gift is a
token; it is not demanded; the value is in the spirit of the giving,
not the material worth.  The gift is made in the open for all to see,
never in secret.  Where a gift is excessive it becomes an embar-
rassment, and is returned. . . . If anything, corruption – as prac-
ticed by exporters from the North as well as by officials in the
South – has perverted positive aspects of this age-old tradition.35
Bribery flourished during Nigeria’s military dictatorship because, as is
the case in many countries today, an all-powerful regime unaccountable to
the rule of law could and did get away with extorting bribes from the less
powerful.36  Bribery is not a part of Nigerian culture, but it is a significant
proves, VANGUARD ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/17745/
41/.
30. Interview with confidential client source.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Oyibo E. Odinamadu, Battling Corruption in Nigeria, USAFRICAONLINE.COM, http://
www.usafricaonline.com/oyibo.nigeriacorrupt1.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
34. Id. (“[The culture of gift giving] is generally an acceptable way of life of the African and
the Nigerian, in particular. In as much it must be emphasized that there is nothing wrong in gift-
giving generally, but when such a gift is meant to attract favour, the gift then becomes a means to
an end and not an end in itself.  Perversion of this gift-giving has caused a lot of problems for
Nigeria.”).
35. See Marong, supra note 9, at n.22 (quoting a letter from Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo to the
Financial Times of London (Oct. 14, 1994)).
36. WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 158 (2006).
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part of the problem today and therefore must be the focus of any solution to
Nigeria’s development stagnation.37
In a world where corruption is one of the leading causes of poverty and
insecurity, “it’s the way it’s done” can no longer justify perpetuating dam-
aging practices.  Businesses may incur short-term costs associated with es-
chewing bribery and corruption, including loss of business and increased
private security costs.  But tremendous benefits will follow. Businesses will
avoid investigation and prosecution by U.S. and European anti-corruption
authorities, and will benefit from greater long-term development of the ju-
risdictions in which they operate.  Private and public entities must take a
holistic approach to combating corruption in Africa that encourages lawful,
healthy, potentially high-reward foreign investment in the continent.  This
approach should include home-country tax incentives for businesses and
individuals considering investment, accountability for corrupt behavior by
those businesses and individuals, and the assurance of good, stable govern-
ance within the host country.  In the end, the rule of law is the foundation of
all other development, and maintenance of a stable rule of law requires that
all parties be committed to it fully.
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING
The Many Forms of Trafficking
Human trafficking is many different things, and includes a set of
crimes that constitute the phenomena of modern slavery and rape for
profit.38  Victims of these crimes around the world are compelled to live
under conditions of involuntary servitude by force, fraud, and coercion.39
In Uganda, a young girl is kidnapped by an older man and forced to care for
37. One African novelist has written: “The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a
failure of leadership.  There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character.  There is
nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else.  The Nigerian
problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge
of personal example which are the hallmarks of true leadership.” CHINUA ACHEBE, THE TROUBLE
WITH NIGERIA 1 (1984).
38. The United Nations defines trafficking in persons as: “[t]he recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerabil-
ity or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.  Exploitation shall include at a mini-
mum, the exploitation of prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”  Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, G.A.
Res. 55/25, at 2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000).
39. According to sources, between twelve and twenty-seven million human beings are en-
slaved in the world at any given time, which means there are more people in slavery today than
were extracted from Africa during 400 hundred years of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. See An-
drew Cockburn, 21st Century Slaves, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2003, available at http://ngm.
nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0309/feature1/index.html; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICK-
ING IN PERSONS REPORT (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/.
\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-1\UST110.txt unknown Seq: 8 10-JUN-09 13:16
2008] ALL HANDS ON DECK 211
him and serve him sexually following his wife’s departure.40  In India, it is
estimated that millions of human beings serve as bonded laborers to brick-
kiln and rice-mill operators. The operators offered these laborers small
loans at usurious interest rates at a time of desperation in exchange for a
lifetime of indentured servitude.41  In Niger and other parts of West Africa,
thousands of people serve as slaves simply because they were born into a
family of slaves.42  In Southeast Asia, children and young adults are traf-
ficked to strategic communities to service sex tourists from Asia and
beyond.43
Each individual story will break your heart, and the magnitude of the
problem can crush the will to intervene.  But there is hope in these stories of
abuse because there is a cause to the problem, and there is a solution.  Ulti-
mately, it is corruption—the lack of a rule of law—that allows trafficking
to thrive.44
Corruption as a Precondition for Trafficking
Corruption is a necessary precondition for human trafficking to flour-
ish.45  Trafficking is a criminal act, and only transpires where the crime is
allowed to occur.46  Officials with the duty to monitor borders, protect chil-
dren, patrol neighborhoods, and enforce the rights of the vulnerable must be
compromised before these brutal forms of exploitation can thrive.47  The
40. Early marriage is prevalent in Uganda and other parts of Africa and can be a brutal form
of trafficking for purposes of sexual exploitation.  See Noah Gottschalk, Uganda: Early Marriage
as a Form of Sexual Violence, FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW, June 2006, at 51, available at http://
www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR27/34.pdf.
41. Many of these bonded slaves are paid less than the high level of interest charged on the
original loan, resulting in a lifetime of slavery.  In such cases the debts (and slavery) can even be
passed on to children after death. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE SMALL HANDS OF LABOR:
BONDED CHILD LABOR IN INDIA 26, 27 (1996), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/
1996/India3.htm.
42. See West Africa Slavery Still Widespread, BBC NEWS, Oct. 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/africa/7693397.stm.
43. See Asia’s Sex Trade is Slavery, BBC NEWS, Feb. 20, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/2783655.stm.
44. See infra pp. 211–15.
45. Julio Bacio-Terracino, Corruption as a Violation of Human Rights, at 15 (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1107918 (“[L]aw enforcement officials must be bribed so
they turn a blind eye to these activities.  When children are not protected by the state against such
criminal practices, the rights of the child to be protected from all forms of sexual exploitation and
sexual abuse, and from abduction, sale and trafficking are violated.  Corruption is essential to
carry out the violation.”).
46. See U.N. Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking [GIFT], Background Paper, The
Vienna Forum to Fight Human Trafficking, Feb. 13–15, 2008 020 Workshop: Corruption and
Human Trafficking: The Grease that Facilitates the Crime, 3, U.N.GIFT B.F.: 020.
47. See DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ), supra note
27, at 12–14 (“Trafficking in human beings is in the hands of organized, internationally networked
criminal groups.  Bribery of officials and political corruption reaching up to the highest levels of
the executive, legislative and judiciary in the home, transit and destination countries are crucial for
the success of human traffickers.  This entails both corruption in the individual phases of traffick-
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first United States federal statute that criminalized trafficking, enacted in
2000, noted that the crime is “often aided by official corruption in countries
of origin, transit, and destination, thereby threatening the rule of law.”48
The robust connection between trafficking and the corruption of law en-
forcement through bribery has been confirmed by several researchers.49
One cited corruption as the most significant indicator of human trafficking
in a country.50  Another study found that a country’s level of corruption not
only correlates with its tier ranking in the U.S. State Department’s Traffick-
ing in Persons report, but is in fact the most reliable factor for predicting a
country’s ranking in the report.51  In other words, the countries with the
highest perceived level of official corruption were also determined by the
United States to be the most tolerant of trafficking within their borders.
This is unsurprising, as the successful trafficking and enslavement of
human beings requires the exercise of complete control over victims and
often entails corruption in all levels of government, including immigration,
customs, banking, and the police.52
The fact that women are disproportionately affected by both official
corruption and human trafficking intensifies the connection between cor-
ruption and human trafficking.  Corruption causes more harm to the poor,53
and women are disproportionately poorer than men worldwide.54  An ero-
sion of the rule of law disproportionately impacts poorer individuals, more
vulnerable and more dependent on others for protection and survival.55
Women are not only on average poorer, but also hold and have less access
to positions of power in government or influence in law-making and enforc-
ing, leaving them more susceptible and vulnerable to corrupt officials.56  To
ing in women – preparing travel documents and residence work permits – and corruption to pre-
vent effective regulation and law enforcement.”).
48. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(b)(8)
(2000).
49. For more on this issue, see Sheldon X. Zhang & Samuel L. Pineda, Corruption as a
Causal Factor in Human Trafficking, in ORGANIZED CRIME: CULTURE, MARKETS AND POLICIES 41
(D. Siegel & H. Nelen eds., 2008).
50. See KEVIN BALES, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL SLAVERY: A READER (2005).
51. See Zhang & Pineda, supra note 49, at 50–51.
52. CORBIN B. LYDAY, 10TH ANNUAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONFERENCE, THE SHADOW MAR-
KET IN HUMAN BEINGS: AN ANTI-CORRUPTION PERSPECTIVE (2001), http://www.10iacc.org/con-
tent.phtml?documents=111&art=134.
53. See Lambsdorff, supra note 9, at 6–8.
54. DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ), supra note 27, at
7–8 (noting that “[t]he majority of the 1.5 billion poor worldwide who have to live on one dollar a
day or less are women”).
55. Non-governmental organizations working in Kenya and Nairobi Women’s Hospital re-
ported that sexual exploitation rose in the wake of Kenya’s election violence in early 2008. During
that time, the rule of law broke down and more than 1,000 people were killed. See Child Prostitu-
tion Up After Kenya’s Election Bloodshed, CNN, July 31, 2008, http://news.myjoyonline.com/
international/200808/18970.asp.
56. DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ), supra note 27, at
8.  In the absence of a strongly-enforced rule of law, justice in many African villages is meted out
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further support the connection between the disempowerment of women and
corruption, research suggests that corruption decreases as the level of par-
ticipation of women in government and law increases up to levels of repre-
sentation that reflect their percentage of the population.57  This research
further solidifies the association between women, corruption, and human
trafficking.58
While the connection between official corruption and human traffick-
ing is clear, it is much easier to convince one that the trafficking of human
beings is a major problem facing Africa than it is to convince one that petty
bribery poses a great threat.  In truth, the two phenomena are linked, and
small bribes cannot be viewed as petty or insignificant when they are symp-
tomatic of a broader corrupted system.  In poor societies, where government
revenues are low, law enforcement salaries are low, and society’s needs are
great, corruption offers easy money to those law enforcement officers who
would exploit others and entices them to become more powerful, wealthier,
and less interested in defending the poor and vulnerable.59  In the end, even
petty corruption eventually transforms the police into guardians of the high-
est bidders.  No longer do they defend the poor and vulnerable—those who
have the greatest need for protection.
Corruption Fuels the Fire of Human Trafficking
Corruption impedes the fight against human trafficking by preventing
the power of legal protection from becoming a reality in the lives of the
poor and vulnerable.  Good laws exist on legislative rolls worldwide, and
legal warehouses are full of domestic laws and international treaties that
criminalize trafficking and protect victims.60  But laws are meaningless
without enforcement, and the mere existence of anticorruption institutions
and resolute rhetoric are insufficient protection.61  Therein lies one of the
by traditional leaders, who are often male and often base decisions on male-centered notions of
sexual roles and human value.
57. See, e.g., Lambsdorff, supra note 9, at 25–26; DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR
TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ), supra note 27, at 3.
58. This research gives good reason to think that both corruption and human trafficking
could be curtailed at least in part by initiatives aimed at empowering women.
59. See Aiko Joshi, The Face of Human Trafficking, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 37–38
(2002).
60. See iKNOWpolitics, List of Laws/Draft Laws on Gender Equality, Anti-Domestic Vio-
lence, Anti-Trafficking and Political Participation in South Asia, May 30, 2008, http://www.i
knowpolitics.org/fr/node/5880; see also Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act,
supra note 48, § 102(b)(8); Initiative Against Sexual Trafficking, List of Anti-Trafficking Laws in
the United States, http://www.iast.net/U.S.Anti-TraffickingLawsGovernmentReportsWebsites.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009); IRIN News Service, Togo: Anti-trafficking law alters route, not flow,
Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=82319.
61. See U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFRICA, supra note 8, at 17 (noting that “New laws and
new government agencies and commissions to control and reduce corruption have had less impact
than expected at their often very public and vocal launch. . . . Anticorruption campaigns are not a
substitute for the difficult tasks of public sector reform and capacity-building.”).
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great tragedies of human existence.  Constitutions the world over guarantee
the right to equal protection under the law, and international treaties prom-
ise fair application of the rule of law.  But laws are ultimately just words on
paper if they do not become a reality in the lives of the most vulnerable.
Without advocacy, the lofty principles of the law are everywhere, but
nowhere.
Strategies to combat trafficking rely on law enforcement officers
charged with enforcing strong laws and ending the practice.  However, in
many jurisdictions where human trafficking flourishes, law enforcement is
actually complicit in the commission of the crimes.62  This complicity is
encouraged by general levels of poverty, low police wages, lack of account-
ability in law enforcement, and the high payoffs traffickers can offer police.
Vulnerable individuals and potential victims lack trust in the police, further
corroding law enforcement efficacy.  Citizens often see the police as op-
pressors instead of rescuers and do not report criminal activity to authorities
in fear that they will not be protected from the consequences.63  Moral ac-
tors are discouraged from working in law enforcement due to the high level
of corruption and the negative perception of police in many jurisdictions,
further eroding the effectiveness of law enforcement.64  In the end, corrup-
tion and a fettered rule of law prevent the protections of good laws from
becoming a reality in the lives of the defenseless and allow human traffick-
ers to operate with impunity.
The Need for Credible Enforcement
Corruption short-circuits the fight against human trafficking, but the
battle is not yet lost.  Human trafficking is a crime of opportunity, and it is
committed only when the costs of committing the crime remain lower than
the benefits received.65  These costs include the direct costs of harboring
and transporting humans, but also the risk that the operation will be found
out and the trafficker will be imprisoned.  This risk is the trafficker’s great-
est cost, and the risk of being apprehended need not become a certainty
before the trafficker will change his trade.66  A credible threat of prosecu-
62. Peter Landesman, The Girls Next Door, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,  Jan. 25, 2004, at 4, (quoting
Gary Haugen, President of International Justice Mission: “Sex trafficking isn’t a poverty issue but
a law-enforcement issue. You can only carry out this trade at significant levels with the coopera-
tion of local law enforcement. In the developing world the police are not seen as a solution for
anything. You don’t run to the police; you run from the police.”).
63. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 44 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997).
64. See Omotunde E.G. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Government, with Spe-
cial Application to Less Developed Countries, 28 KYKLOS: INT’L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 47, 57
(1975).
65. This presumes that the trafficker is a rational economic actor who seeks to maximize
economic gains.
66. The outcome of incarceration is so negative for the human trafficker that it requires a
much smaller percentage chance that this outcome will take place before the expected value of
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tion—perhaps even as simple as the existence of a police force that is fairly
compensated, trained, and corrupted only at great cost—will lead most ra-
tional traffickers to shut down operations.67
The rule of law changes human behavior.68  Evidence shows that Pro-
hibition, for example, impacted the drinking habits of Americans dramati-
cally during its enforcement, and continued that impact for years after the
amendment was repealed.69  Because a consistently applied rule of law
changes human behavior, any strategy to combat human trafficking must
include an attenuation of official corruption to the point that a firm and
consistent rule of law is imposed upon those who trade in human souls.70
SOLUTION: INITIATIVES THAT BRING CONSISTENT, TANGIBLE
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THOSE WHO OFFER AND ACCEPT BRIBES
This paper has examined the significant negative consequences of cor-
ruption on development, the positive connection between corruption and
human trafficking, and the need for a strong rule of law and accountability
to curb both.  In light of the foregoing, only global anti-corruption initia-
tives that bring consistent, tangible accountability to those who offer and
accept bribes can curtail corruption and alleviate the scourge of human
trafficking.
Existing Laws
The current landscape of global anti-corruption initiatives is dominated
by several multinational instruments and the United States’ Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA).71  The model multinational instrument, the Organi-
that cost will be too much for the trafficker to risk. Risk averse traffickers may shut down opera-
tions under even small or slight risk of a highly negative outcome, such as a lifetime of
incarceration.
67. This is deterrence. Not all traffickers have to be caught before human trafficking comes
to an end. You only need to catch a sufficient number to present a credible threat of capture to the
others.
68. Notice how vehicle traffic visibly slows when approaching a known speed camera loca-
tion, and then accelerates again once it passes the speed camera location. Certain knowledge of
negative consequences for illegal behavior changes the behavior of rational human beings.
69. Annual per capita consumption of alcohol was 2.60 gallons from 1906 to 1910. In 1934,
after the repeal of Prohibition, that figure was less than one gallon, and even in 1945 per capita
consumption was only two gallons. Figures show that per capita consumption of alcohol did not
rise to pre-Prohibition levels until 1975. See Norman H. Clark, Prohibition and Temperance, in
THE READER’S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 871, 873 (Eric Foner & John A. Garraty eds.,
1991).
70. For more on how the rule of law changes human behavior, see NORMAN GEISLER &
FRANK TUREK, LEGISLATING MORALITY 29 (1998).
71. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (amended by
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988), Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415 (amended
by the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998), Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1998) [hereinafter
FCPA].
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zation for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Corruption Convention), was adopted in November
1997.72  Prior to that time the FCPA, adopted in 1977, was the only major
legislation of global reach that focused on international corruption.  The
FCPA was and remains an instrument focused on regulating the corrupt
behavior of global corporations in paying bribes—that is, with a focus on
the supply side of corruption.73  The FCPA is a domestic law that is vigor-
ously enforced by U.S. authorities.74  By contrast, the primary multinational
instruments combating global corruption attempt to regulate both the supply
and demand sides of corruption, addressing both the payment of bribes by
private entities and the solicitation and acceptance of bribes by government
officials. These instruments include the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC),75 the Inter-American Convention Against Corrup-
tion (IACAC),76 and the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption (AU Corruption Convention).77  Each of these in-
struments contains strong prohibitions, but relies primarily on domestic
laws and local enforcement officials to give the prohibitions force.78  These
instruments therefore do not, on their own, offer the solutions needed to
curb corruption in impacted countries.
Similarly, other initiatives and pressures used to limit corruption, in-
cluding local anticorruption commissions, task forces, and withholding of
funds for aid and infrastructure, have proven to be of limited use in part
because they do not serve as credible deterrents against individuals commit-
ting acts of bribery or corruption.  The Democratic Republic of Congo
(Zaire) provides a telling example of how pressures from international orga-
nizations to limit corruption in exchange for financing are of limited effi-
cacy.  During the brutal thirty-two-year reign of Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire
received almost $10 billion in foreign aid, up to $550 million per year.
These funds came with repeated calls for reform and transparency, and
threats to withdraw funding if changes were not instituted.79  Despite four
72. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 1.
73. See FCPA, supra note 71, at §§ 78dd-1(a) to -1(f)(1), -2(a).
74. The United States Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission for-
mally prosecuted thirty-eight cases under the FCPA in 2007, and was on pace to match or exceed
those numbers in 2008.  Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher LLP, 2008 Mid-Year FCPA Update July 7,
2008, http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2008Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx.
75. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Oct. 7, 2003),
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/conventioncorruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf.
76. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724.
77. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43
I.L.M. 5 (the AU Corruption Convention entered into force on Aug. 5, 2006).
78. Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International Law in
Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691, 734–39 (2007).
79. MICHELA WRONG, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF MR. KURTZ 196 (2000).
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failed International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization plans and an internal
World Bank report in 1979 that painted Mobutu as running an unrepentant
kleptocracy, noting that “there is no – I repeat no – chance on the horizon
that Zaire’s many creditors will recover their funds,” it was not until 1990
that the World Bank and IMF cut off funding to Zaire.  In the wake of the
wreckage, Zaire’s populace was saddled with a crushing $14.5 billion
debt.80  Transparency International estimates that Mobutu personally em-
bezzled over $5 billion from Zaire, making him the third most corrupt
leader in history.81
Demand Side and Supply Side Efforts
Stronger domestic laws, consistently and vigorously enforced, are
needed.  Laws must address both the supply and demand sides of corruption
and keep all relevant parties (multinational companies, governments, and
government officials) committed to anticorruption principles.  The need is
not simply for good laws, but for enforced laws82 that hold all parties
accountable.83
Demand Side
Demand-focused anticorruption initiatives seek to hold accountable
government officials and police that protect human traffickers or those who
seek to profit from human trafficking.  Such initiatives often focus on local
law enforcement and frequently include training or other resources designed
to build the capacity of law enforcement to conduct investigations or other-
wise build, promote, and enforce the rule of law.  These measures include
efforts to build accountability within the ranks of law enforcement, such as
robust internal affairs divisions, and incentives for reporting improprieties
within ranks.  Some specific examples of these initiatives include cross-
jurisdiction training cooperation undertaken by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
(OPDAT) and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program (ICITAP).84 The U.S. Department of Justice has also made efforts
80. Id. at 200–02; see also U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFRICA, supra note 8.
81. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT (2004), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2004#download.
82. See Snider & Kidane, supra note 78. See also Brian Iselin, Regional Legal Expert,
Human Trafficking, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Remarks at the Human Rights
Challenge of Globalization in Asia Pacific U.S.: Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children (Nov. 13, 2002) (referencing the “yawning gap between adequate law and adequate
enforcement”).
83. For more on the need to keep both governments and private entities accountable, see
PATRICK X. DELANEY, TRANSNATIONAL CORRUPTION: REGULATION ACROSS BORDERS 13–14
(Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government 2005).
84. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and
Training (OPDAT) section develops and administers technical assistance designed to enhance the
capabilities of foreign justice sector institutions and their law enforcement personnel, so they can
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to collaborate with local officials in investigations of trafficking and other
cross-jurisdictional sexual offenses under the Prosecutorial Remedies and
Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act.85
Most current global initiatives to combat corruption are demand-focused.86
Supply Side
Supply-focused anticorruption initiatives seek to hold accountable
those individuals or entities willing to pay bribes to protect illegal opera-
tions or avoid lawful government processes.  These operations may be
human trafficking operations, private foreign or multinational corporations
seeking to skirt onerous legal processes or obtain a contract or an unlawful
advantage, or even a foreign tourist seeking to avoid a court visit for a
violation of law.  The best example of a supply-focused initiative is the
United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which aims to curb corrupt
practices of private corporations working in countries where bribery and
corruption are prevalent.87
IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE-ENTITY, DEMAND-SIDE EFFORTS
IN COMBATING CORRUPTION
Bribery erodes both the ability and incentive of public law enforce-
ment to do its vital job.88  A consistent rule of law is the foundation of
development in Africa, and a consistent rule of law requires full commit-
ment from all actors.  Corruption undermines the rule of law, so developing
jurisdictions need foreign countries to hold their corporations accountable
for acts that perpetuate corruption and hamper its eradication.
effectively partner with the Department of Justice in combating terrorism, trafficking in persons,
organized crime, corruption, and financial crimes. The International Criminal Investigative Train-
ing Assistance Program (ICITAP) works with foreign governments to develop professional and
transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce
the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. Situated in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Crimi-
nal Division, and funded primarily by the State Department, ICITAP provides international devel-
opment assistance that supports both national security and foreign policy objectives.
85. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
(PROTECT) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
86. See Reyes Calderon, Jose Luis Alvarez Arce & Silvia Mayoral, Corporation as a Crucial
Ally Against Corruption, J. BUS. ETHICS (2008), http://www.springerlink.com/content/r575486262
915415/.
87. See FCPA, supra note 71.
88. As an example, in one oil-rich West African nation there are no official government fees
for transiting cargo through the country, or for obtaining a visa for a citizen from a country where
no embassy of this West African state exists. However, a litany of unofficial payments are re-
quired to various officials in multiple government agencies in the capital before cargo can be
transited or a visa will be issued. In this process state coffers receive no income from the issuance
of visas locally, and therefore the citizens of this West African state receive no tangible benefit
from this government service. Interview with confidential client source.
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In fact, private entities have every business incentive to end their in-
volvement in corruption and bribery.89  Corruption costs private entities
millions of dollars in transaction costs, bribes, and time lost to negotiating
payoffs.90  In the current sensitive enforcement environment, clients and
customers expect companies to be vigilant in implementing anticorruption
programs.91  Companies lose business and profits to corruption and related
unfair business practices.  Therefore, it is in the interest of all private enti-
ties to see corruption curbed and uncertainty limited.92  Companies should
work to eradicate corruption from their ranks for the good of their own
operations, as well as for the development of the jurisdictions in which they
work.
It will take supply-side forces—foreign and multinational private enti-
ties—joining governments in the fight against corruption to bring about sig-
nificant change, and the FCPA and other anticorruption legislation is an
important part of that battle.  The World Bank Governance and Anticorrup-
tion Report cites the corporation as a “crucial ally against corruption,” and
the UN notes the corporation is a “key pillar of integrity” in the corruption
battle.93  Nevertheless, corporations have little incentive to self-enforce
given global competition and need third-party accountability to help level
the playing field.94
The United States government must continue to enforce principles of
fair play against corporations subject to United States law, even in the face
of competition from abroad.95  The FCPA and other supply-side anticorrup-
tion initiatives play an important role in the battle against corruption, as the
FCPA can hold private players accountable without reliance upon public
justice systems in jurisdictions with high levels of corruption.
CONCLUSION: ANTICORRUPTION INITIATIVES AND THEIR IMPACT
ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Only global anticorruption initiatives that bring consistent, tangible ac-
countability to those who offer and accept bribes can curb human rights
89. See Michael Howlett & Jeremy Rayner, Globalization and Governance Capacity: Ex-
plaining Divergence in National Forest Programs as Instances of “Next-Generation” Regulation
in Canada and Europe, 19(2) GOVERNANCE 251 (2006).
90. See Marong, supra note 9, at 107. See also Calderon, supra note 86, at 6.
91. See Calderon, supra note 86, at 6.
92. See Hannah Clark, Are Anti-Bribe Laws Working?, FORBES, Oct. 13, 2006, http://www.
forbes.com/corporategovernance/2006/10/12/leadership-bribery-scandal-lead-govern-cx_hc_1013
bribe2.html (“[Forty-four percent] of American respondents said they had lost contracts because
they wouldn’t pay a bribe.”).
93. See Calderon, supra note 86, at 5 (citing the World Bank Group, Strengthening Bank
Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption, DC2006-0017 (2006)).
94. See id. at 7 (“[I]n the short-term, corruption creates lucrative opportunities with low risk
for unethical corporations.”).
95. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, 85(3)
FOREIGN AFF. 75 (2006).
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violations in Africa like human trafficking.  As corruption decreases, traf-
ficking will decrease.  With a balanced increase in credible supply- and
demand-side corruption initiatives—those that increase accountability for
government and law enforcement officials, and increase accountability for
individuals and private entities that help perpetuate corruption—the payoffs
for corrupt behavior will drop, and fewer individuals will take part in the
activity.  Specifically, as law enforcement officials charged with protecting
vulnerable women and children from predators come to understand that the
risk of accepting bribes and payments from traffickers outweighs the bene-
fit, the protection of the law will be put behind the vulnerable instead of
behind rapists and kidnappers.  Once traffickers find that law enforcement
officials are less likely to accept their payoffs to protect their illegal activi-
ties, they will be forced to move elsewhere or shut down their operations.
When the scales tip and the full protection of the law settles on the side of
victims, a key battle in the war against human trafficking will have been
won.
